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he recent past has been a miserable 
time for political relations between 
Russia and both the EU and the US. 
While business has been booming on the 
back of Russia’s huge gains from the sky-
rocketing price of oil and gas, the foreign 
policy scene has been desolate.  
All parties are contributing to the present grumbling 
dissatisfactions: Russia’s bullying foreign policy 
towards its smaller neighbours, its trouble-making over 
Kosovo and its ugly ultra-nationalist rhetoric, the EU’s 
inability to shape common positions towards Russia on 
either political or energy questions, the greatly 
damaged credibility of the present leadership of the 
United States, Russia’s complaints that it was cheated 
by NATO in the 1990s, the row over missile defences 
etc.  
But renewal of leadership is now on the horizon in all 
three cases: in Russia already in May, in the US by the 
end of the year, and for the EU the Lisbon Treaty will 
bring at the turn of the year a new Presidency of the 
European Council and a reinforced role for the High 
Representative for foreign affairs.  
Is it possible now to sketch the substantive moves that 
would allow the new leaders to transform the present 
sad state of affairs between Russia and the West? The 
case for doing so is strong. The West has a huge 
interest in integrating Russia into its economic, political 
and security structures, if that can be done in mutually 
acceptable ways. Europe and the West need to get their 
affairs in order together, to be better placed to face the 
new foreign policy challenges presented by the rise of 
Asia and the emerging multi-polar world. 
The following package of four initiatives is proposed: 
1.  Russia should be invited to enter dialogue over the 
hypothesis of becoming a full member of NATO, 
leading to the working out of the necessarily huge 
preparatory agenda. 
2.  The content of the next Treaty between the EU and 
Russia should be built around three strong points: 
o  Visa-free travel 
o  Free trade in goods and services 
o  A concordat on rules for reciprocal investment 
in energy. 
3.  Ukraine should be offered both a NATO 
membership action plan, and a perspective of EU 
membership. 
4.  The EU and US should work with Russia to help 
resolve the four ‘simmering’ (more than ‘frozen’) 
conflicts of the former Soviet space.  
Russia wishes to be part of Europe on terms that it can 
accept. The package is intended to achieve a qualitative 
change in the perceived advantages and incentives to 
switch into a truly cooperative and integrative mode 
between the parties, leaving behind the present mode of 
discourse that reflects resentments and distrust.  
The offer of the package would be the tipping-point, 
releasing huge positive possibilities that are currently 
blocked. During Putin’s Presidency, Russia has 
repeatedly demonstrated that outside NATO and 
without a truly strategic partnership with the EU, it can 
cause a lot of trouble. The point has been made, 
accompanied at times by surrealist paranoid discourse.
1 
But for the future this only illustrates the scope for a 
better set of relations.  
                                                      
1 The ultimate in MAD (mutually assured destruction – to 
use the terminology of nuclear weapon strategists) surrealism 
came in the debates in 2007 and 2008 over the US missile 
defence initiative, when Russia expressed concern that the 
capacity of its strategic nuclear missiles to destroy West 
European capitals would be diminished. 
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1.  NATO and Russia 
NATO is the key. Even if there are still grumbling 
irritations between Russia and NATO, the idea of the 
two parties truly drifting into a real new cold war is 
ridiculous. NATO and Russia share the same objective 
security threats. NATO has moved a long way in recent 
years into an organisation working at the level of 
‘coalitions of the willing’.  
The lengthy communiqué of NATO’s Bucharest 
summit in April 2008 serves as a comprehensive 
statement of the alliance’s objectives. How would 
Russia’s membership perspective relate to each of the 
major points?  
i.  Crisis management instruments: Russia could be a 
valuable contributor.  
ii.  Terrorism: Common interests are evident. Russia 
has a key role to play in preventing the risk of 
nuclear materials falling into terrorist hands. 
iii.  Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty: 
Negotiated in the 1980s in the context of the cold 
war, this has become politically obsolete, although 
it was initially successful in reducing the number of 
tanks, armored vehicles and artillery pieces in the 
European theatre. The Treaty would be radically 
reconsidered in the new context, overriding 
negative developments (the West’s non-ratification 
and Russia’s recent withdrawal).  
iv.  Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD): Common interests are evident, and 
existing elements of cooperation such as over Iran 
and North Korea would be enhanced.  
v.  Missile defence: The great row of 2007-08 over the 
proposed US installations in Poland and the Czech 
Republic involves a subject matter that is inherently 
a desirable matter for collaboration with Russia, 
since it addresses common threats such as 
intermediate range missiles from Iran. The political 
context has hindered this, but would be transformed 
in the new context. Several mechanisms for 
technical collaboration over missile defence exist. 
vi.  Energy security: Russia’s contribution could in the 
new context be massively important, indeed 
uniquely so. 
vii. Cyber defence: This is a new area with cooperation 
potential. 
viii.  Afghanistan: There is already a degree of 
cooperation, with Russia’s agreement to allow 
NATO over-flying rights. The common interests in 
countering the resurgence of Al Qaeda terrorism 
and the exports of drugs are evident. While Russia 
will not want to deploy troops there in view of its 
earlier Soviet experience, the scope for deeper 
cooperation exists.  
ix.  Kosovo: 2008 marked the high point of 
disagreement over whether to recognise its 
independence. But now Kosovo is a de facto state 
with recognition by many but not all NATO and 
EU states. The future is about managing the new 
situation. In a new context Russia could become 
helpful, in providing reassurance to the Serb 
minorities. 
x.  Enlargement: The controversial cases of Ukraine 
and Georgia would be totally transformed in the 
context of Russia also approaching membership. 
President Putin has said as much. 
xi.  Frozen conflicts: The new context would provide 
the missing ingredient for the EU, the US and 
Russia to converge on making solutions – we return 
to the details below. 
xii. Black Sea: With the prospect of both Russia’s and 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO, the highly 
inflammable situation in Crimea and Sebastapol 
would be greatly eased in the new context.  
Of course there should be a preparatory period of 
sufficient length, for which the greatest of all 
membership action plans would have to be negotiated. 
A different method and terminology should be devised 
for Russia, rather than that used for some militarily 
insignificant newly acceding states. Russia’s new 
Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, recently 
commented: “Great powers do not join alliances, they 
create alliances”. Maybe we could settle for “re-
creating NATO”?   
There would be no guarantee of accession, or this act of 
re-creation, with consensus of all existing member 
states required. But the political objective and new 
directions would be clear. But there should also be 
some immediately operational steps to make the bridge 
between today and tomorrow. Two examples come to 
mind.  
First the NATO-Russia dialogue is insufficiently 
developed at the summit level. Only foreign ministers, 
ambassadors and officials meet regularly, but there is 
nothing remotely equivalent to the EU’s half-yearly 
summits with Russia, where the EU is represented by 
the Presidency and the Commission. NATO has the 
problem that it does not have a presidency, and the 
international staff is not strongly institutionalised. The 
existing 26+1 (now becoming 28+1) format of the 
NATO-Russia Council, with all NATO member states 
and Russia, is useful but too cumbersome for a creative 
dialogue. 
A new political mechanism is needed to give direction 
and coherence to its relations with NATO, alongside 
the EU. Ongoing changes to the G8 summit process 
open up one route. The G7 summit process was first 
enlarged to G8 to include Russia, but now this now 
seems set to go global and become G12, including Time to think of a strategic bargain with Russia | 3 
Brazil, China, India and South Africa. There could 
therefore be a new G4 for Euro-Atlantic relations, with 
summits bringing together the EU (with its new 
leadership), Russia, the US and NATO (with its 
secretary general).  
Second, there might be ways to build on the NATO-
Russia Council towards something approaching partial 
membership of NATO. Initially certain NATO tasks 
where there already was consensus, or where consensus 
should be rather easily achieved, could be devolved to 
the NATO-Russia Council, starting for example with 
terrorism, WMD proliferation, cyber defence and 
certain crisis management operations. 
2.  The EU and Russia 
Russia is not a plausible candidate for EU membership, 
because it is not willing to accept the intrusive mass of 
supranational laws, norms and standards that EU 
membership demands; and the EU could not plausibly 
envisage Russia’s accession as the largest member state 
until and unless there was a revolutionary convergence 
of political norms and trust, which is not on the 
horizon. 
However the EU and Russia are likely to begin 
negotiations soon for a comprehensive new Treaty. In 
the present political climate this is likely to be a thin 
document, consisting mostly of declarations of 
intention to cooperate, following the very extensive 
work of dialogue already underway for the so-called 
four common spaces: 1) Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, 2) Freedom, Security and Justice, 3) 
Research, Education and Culture, and 4) External 
Security. The agenda of these common spaces are 
encyclopaedic lists of topics, for many of which there 
are bilateral dialogue groups meeting regularly, as 
recorded in the Commission’s progress reports.
2 This 
in-depth engagement at the official level is certainly 
positive, but its operational content is so far lacking in 
strategic significance. To raise the level of ambition, 
there have to be a few strategic core features, whose 
significance will be self-evident to the population at 
large. Accordingly we propose three items as strategic 
priorities: visa-free travel, free trade and rules for 
investment in the energy sector; a fourth, concerning 
the simmering conflicts, is treated later since it also 
involves the US. 
Visa-free travel. The feasibility of moving to a visa-
free regime between the EU and Russia has greatly 
improved. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements 
have recently entered into force. Already there are 
believed to be about 5 million Russians living in the 
                                                      
2 European Commission, “EU-Russia Common Spaces – 
Progress Report 2007”, March 2007. 
EU with no major problems emerging over the quality 
of their integration, except for post-Soviet tensions still 
in the Baltic states. At the same time economic 
conditions in Russia have categorically improved, with 
much increased salary levels and labour shortages 
leading now to tendencies of return migration back to 
Russia. Whereas in the early 1990s, visa-free travel 
would have triggered mass migratory movements, for 
these scenarios are receding. Instead there emerges a 
plausible model of two-way and circular migratory 
flows, which is exactly what is desired to facilitate a 
progressive integration and convergence of political 
values.  
At least the words ‘visa-free travel’ are already on the 
official agenda. In April 2007, the EU and Russia 
agreed on procedures to examine the conditions for 
visa-free travel in the long run. Moreover there are new 
technical possibilities to retain checks and controls over 
the movement of individuals without recourse to visas.
3 
In February 2008, the Commission advanced ambitious 
proposals for an entry/exit registration system for all 
foreigners, whether they are required to possess a visa 
or not, based on a data base capable of storing 
biometric data. This may be complemented by an 
Electronic Travel Authorisation System, which would 
see non-EU travellers check on-line that their status 
reveals no negative indicators (and seems similar to a 
system that Australia already uses). Typically visitors 
profiting from visa-free travel are able to spend three 
months before having to request a residence permit. 
The Schengen Information System (SIS) will register 
individuals who overstay the period of their legally 
valid visit.
4 The introduction of passports with strong 
security features and biometric recording of border 
crossings (thumb prints and eye scans) will provide 
safeguards against the use of falsified passports. Finally 
the existing re-admission agreement between the EU 
and Russia requires acceptance of the return of those 
ordered to leave because of the illegality of their stay. 
The time delay in establishing a visa-free regime with 
the new technological supports will be quite a number 
of years, but the key point for the shorter run is to set in 
motion a clear and viable plan, which now seems 
feasible.  
Free trade. The second feature would be to enter into a 
free trade agreement. This is easy for the EU to 
propose, but more controversial for Russia, which is 
concerned by the poor competitivity of its industries 
outside the commodity sectors. But free trade offers to 
                                                      
3 Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera and Florian Geyer, The 
Commission’s New Border Package – Does it take us one 
step closer to a ‘cyber-fortress Europe’?, CEPS Policy Brief 
No. 154, March 2008.  
4 European Commission, “Communication on Preparing the 
next steps on border management of the European Union”, 
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Russia great advantages: alleviation of inflationary 
pressures, improvement in consumer welfare and 
favourable conditions for Russian industry to enter into 
global supply chains. Continuing protection means 
reinforcing the non-competitivity of Russian industry, 
which at some stage when commodity prices ease will 
become a real problem. Free trade negotiations could 
start immediately after Russia’s WTO accession, and 
the prospect of this more ambitious scenario could 
provide the motivation to finally sweep away the 
remaining obstacles to WTO accession.  
The EU proposes these days a doctrine of deep and 
comprehensive free trade with its neighbours, which 
however leaves ample scope for negotiating the precise 
depth of the agreement. Since the EU is preparing for 
deep free trade agreements with all its neighbours, and 
has already begun to negotiate with Ukraine, an 
agreement with Russia would open the prospect of 
completing a pan-Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. 
Russia is currently averse to adopting European 
standards, insisting on its own, but its high-level 
political discourse often seems to confuse matters of 
political principle and economic technicalities. In the 
field of tradeable product standards and the regulation 
of the major service sectors, Russia’s political objective 
of ‘modernisation’ can be advanced by its economy 
aligning with best accepted international standards, 
which EU standards generally represent.
5 
Rules for the energy sector. The third feature would be 
in the energy sector, where President Putin has hinted 
at the possibility of a deal for mutual openness for 
investment. The difficulties here are well known, as 
illustrated by Russia’s outright refusal to ratify the 
European Energy Charter and its proposed transit 
protocol, which would have limited Gazprom’s 
monopoly control over its gas pipelines. However the 
two parties seem intent on making a bilateral energy 
agreement as part of the next Treaty. What are the 
prospects of this succeeding? The scale of the EU-
Russia mutual interdependence is huge, which means 
that there should be scope for a mutually advantageous 
agreement, which negotiators have still to work out, 
that would clarify and consolidate the legal rules for 
investment and supply security. 
A first requirement is for the EU itself to develop its 
own energy policy, which recent Commission 
proposals seek to do.
6 In its internal aspects, a key 
feature would be to couple competitive integration of 
the internal market with the ‘unbundling’ of those 
enterprises that combine production, networks for 
                                                      
5 This is illustrated in some detail in European Commission, 
“EU-Russia Common Spaces – Progress Report 2007”, 
March 2007.   
6 European Commission, “An Energy Policy for Europe”, 
COM(2007)1.  
wholesale distribution and retail distributors. This 
would apply without discrimination to both EU and 
foreign investors.  
However investment in the control of transmission 
assets by foreigners from outside the EU would be 
contingent on the EU and the home country of the 
foreign investor entering into a bilateral agreement. 
This could lead naturally into the energy component of 
a next EU-Russia Treaty. The EU for its part would like 
to secure greater openness and stability in the 
conditions for its energy enterprises to invest in Russia. 
For its part Russia restricts foreign participation in 
strategic sectors, including energy, to less than 
controlling share holdings. The general principle would 
be to establish reciprocity for identified asset classes, 
with the possibility then to negotiate progressive 
dismantlement of restrictions on investment.
7 An 
alternative view argues that cooperation with Russia 
should be based on investment in projects of common 
interest, such as energy efficiency, stopping the flaring 
of gas, and the capture and sequestration of CO2 
emissions.
8  
3.  Ukraine, NATO and the EU 
Ukraine is struggling to consolidate its democracy, its 
unity as a state and its drive to become fully part of the 
Euro-Atlantic community. It is receiving mixed signals 
from European countries, which are divided over 
whether to offer the perspective of membership of 
either EU, or NATO, or both. Both the EU and NATO 
have proven methods to prepare applicants for 
membership. The Communiqué of the NATO 
Bucharest summit of April 2008 concluded: 
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership of 
NATO. We agreed that these countries will 
become members of NATO … Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) is the next step for Ukraine 
and Georgia on their direct way to 
membership. …We have asked foreign 
ministers to make a first assessment of 
progress at their December 2008 meeting. 
This seemingly highly positive language masked deep 
divergences among European states, with France and 
Germany blocking the opening of the MAP process at 
least for the time being. President Putin lobbied hard to 
block such a decision for both Ukraine and Georgia, 
saying that it would lead to the division and destruction 
of the Ukrainian state, while hinting that if Russia were 
                                                      
7 Dieter Helm, “The Russian dimension and Europe’s 
external energy policy”, mimeo, Oxford University 
(www.dieterhelm.co.uk).  
8 Claude Mandil, “Sécurité énergétique et Union Européenne 
– Propositions pour la présidence française”, Rapport au 
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to be truly integrated into Western defence structures 
the problem would be dissolved. While questions 
concerning Ukraine or Georgia’s military preparedness 
for membership are real, the issue at heart was 
supremely political, as eloquently argued on the eve of 
the Bucharest summit in the pages of Le Monde.  
Tomorrow opens at Bucharest the summit 
meeting of NATO, the most important since 
the end of the cold war, and we wish to recall 
the hundreds and thousands of students, 
peasants and workers who invaded the streets 
of Tbilisi and Kiev [during the Rose and 
Orange Revolutions] brandishing European, 
French, German, English and American flags. 
These unarmed men and women were the 
worthy successors of Vaclav Havel, Lech 
Walesa, the East German pastors and the 
Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals. They 
incarnated Europe, that great adventure of our 
times of which, from Paris to Berlin, we have 
such difficulty in grasping its exalting and 
revolutionary aspect. They demand today to be 
associated with the organisation that has for 
almost 60 years assured the security of our 
democracies. In whose name do we refuse 
them? Who dares assume responsibility before 
future generations for slamming the door on 
their noses at so decisive a moment for their 
history and ours?
9 
The EU confronts exactly the same issue over whether 
to offer a ‘membership perspective’ to Ukraine. The 
EU is similarly divided like NATO. Poland, most new 
member states, the Baltic member states and the UK 
support the granting of these seemingly sacred words, 
which do not contain any guarantee, but only hope. 
Again France and Germany lead the opposition. 
Negotiations are engaged for a New Enhanced 
Agreement, which will incorporate a deep free trade 
agreement, while the political language is today likely 
to fall short of a clear membership perspective. 
However the EU has not hit gridlock with its recent 
enlargement, and the Lisbon Treaty improves the 
institutional system. If this proves insufficient in some 
years from now, let the system be improved again. 
4.  Purging the simmering conflicts 
Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno 
Karabakh are no frozen conflicts. All are in motion, or 
risk the outbreak of new violence. Their resolution, or 
at least a neutering of their potential for violence and 
political destabilisation, would be among the necessary 
confidence-building measures in preparing for Russia’s 
accession to NATO. Plausible scenarios for purging 
                                                      
9 Andre Gluksman and Bernar-Henri Levy, “Accueillez 
l’Ukraine et la Georgie”, Le Monde, 2 avril 2008 [our 
translation]. 
these simmering conflicts exist, but unity of purpose 
between the three big external parties – Russia, the US 
and the EU – could be decisive. The many years of 
fruitless diplomacy around all four conflicts have at 
least served to sort out the scenarios between the 
hopeless and more plausible. So far, Russia manifestly 
sees its national interest in sustaining tensions over 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The new 
context could change this. As and when the three 
external powers demonstrate credible unity of purpose, 
the principal parties will themselves understand a new 
context within which to negotiate. The starting point for 
each of these negotiations is outlined briefly below. 
Transnistria. The closest to resolution, negotiations 
between the parties to this conflict are ongoing, 
including at the 5+2 format (Russia, Ukraine, EU, US, 
and OSCE + Moldova and Transnistria). The 
European factor is at work, with Transnistria’s 
industrial enterprises having increasingly opted to 
register as Moldovan enterprises in order to gain 
access to the EU market. In addition the EU’s Border 
Assistance Mission on the Moldovan and Ukrainian 
borders with Transnistria helps to reduce illegal 
trafficking and improve trust. A federative solution is 
not agreed, but variants have been tabled.  
Abkhazia. The situation is one of serious tension and 
some violence (a Russia MIG shot down a Georgian 
unmanned drone flying over Abkhazia in April 2008). 
President Saakashvili’s insistence on a final federative 
solution met intransigent rejection. Russia has taken 
steps amounting to creeping recognition, if not 
annexation. The softly spoken consensus in the West 
is that Saakashvili’s pursuit of a federative solution is 
not today the way ahead, and that Tbilisi should open 
its road and rail frontiers to Abkhazia to allow 
commerce and personal contacts to deepen. A partial 
territorial adjustment, with the Gali district returning 
to Georgia is conceivable. The question of a final 
constitutional settlement should be deferred for years, 
to allow normal relations between people and 
businesses to start up again and broadly develop.  
South Ossetia. This situation also entails serious 
tensions and some violence (a Russian air force 
fighter dropped a missile near a Georgian radar in 
August 2007). This scattering of villages – some 
Russian-speaking, some Georgian – makes no sense 
as a political entity, except as an outpost of Russian 
attempts to weaken Georgia. The villages and towns 
can plausibly have local government responsibilities, 
for example choosing their preferred language 
regimes for schools.  
Nagorno Karabakh. At least here Russia, the US and 
France, as co-chairs of the OSCE ‘Minsk group’ 
mediation effort, are relatively united, and have 
advanced proposals. The latest one is believed to based 
on the withdrawal of Armenian forces for occupied 6 | Michael Emerson 
Azeri territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh itself, 
which would disenclave Nakichevan, see the re-
opening of the railway line between Baku and Yerevan 
and grant Armenia a guaranteed corridor into Nagorno 
Karabakh. Turkey could add the re-opening of its 
frontier with Armenia. Both Armenian and Azeri sides 
seem to believe that time is on their sides with the 
status quo, with Azerbaijan believing that its oil-
revenue funded rearmament will tip the balance of 
military power in its favour in due course. Russia, the 
US, the EU and Turkey could together make it clear to 
the ‘party of war’ in Baku that there can be no such 
solutions. 
5.  Conclusion – Organising the tipping 
point 
The objective is to identify a sufficient package of steps 
of manifest strategic significance for both governments 
and public opinion such that Russian relations with the 
EU and the US would not just improve but reach a 
tipping point. This would replace the current miserable 
political climate of mutual criticism with a new era of 
historic significance.  
Post-Soviet Russia has been through two episodes: first 
Yeltsin’s revolutionary but chaotic dismantling of 
communism, and then Putin’s consolidation of the 
Russian state internally and externally. Putin’s 
consolidation has come with a strident nationalist 
political discourse, which in foreign policy has for 
Westerners had disturbingly aggressive and even 
paranoid aspects. Perhaps this episode may now come 
to an end.  
One may speculate further that Russia could be on the 
verge of a third stage, to emerge maybe gradually after 
the change of presidency, in which a richer and self-
confident Russia might be open to a categorically more 
positive relationship with Europe in particular. This 
would be because Russia wishes to be included in 
modern Europe, without seeking membership of the 
EU, and sees the case for a more attractive re-branding 
of its foreign policy profile, thereby securing objective 
advantages for its people, economy and political 
strategy. 
Our leaders all say they are against new dividing lines 
within Europe. But do they mean it? Or, more 
precisely, are they capable of envisaging steps to 
dissolve the discursive divisions that exist today with 
Russia, and clarify for Ukraine whether it is really set 
to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic institutions or is 
destined to remain a fuzzy borderline case.   
Our argument is that these divisions and confusions 
will remain unless the strategic framework is clarified, 
with: 
o  an invitation to Russia to open a fundamental 
dialogue over the perspective of NATO 
membership, and the conditions that would go with 
this; the process could be started with intermediate 
steps of institutional and operational content; 
o  an offer by the EU to include clear strategic 
objectives in its next Treaty with Russia; and 
o  a clear offer of membership perspective to Ukraine 
from both NATO (i.e. membership action plan) and 
the EU (here the membership perspective language 
in the next Treaty would be sufficient).  
One type of Western position is to say that potential 
members of NATO and/or the EU should demonstrate 
their will to converge on Western/European values and 
standards before raising ‘premature’ questions of future 
membership. This kind of position is clearly relevant 
for Russia in relation to NATO, and for Ukraine in 
relation to both NATO and the EU. But such positions 
beg questions of strategic political psychology and of 
incentives. What is attractive or acceptable with a 
membership perspective may be too costly without it. 
There can be different political equilibrium positions in 
relation to the complex agenda of organisations such as 
NATO and the EU, with these equilibria reinforced by 
synergies between agenda items, according to whether 
or not the context is that of a perspective of 
membership. The task is to organise the tipping point to 
switch from one equilibrium to another. The time 
horizon for this may be quite long, but the short-term 
issue is whether to place a visible objective on the 
horizon. 
To start the process, there is need for institutional 
improvements to enhance strategic dialogue, especially 
between NATO and Russia. Accordingly it is suggested 
that arrangements are made for a regular-summit level 
dialogue of the NATO-Russia Council and/or for a new 
G4 summit process (for Russia, US, EU and NATO) 
given the expected widening of G8. 
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